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bringing the regulations within the definition of a rule. ADEM's
procedures constituted a rule because they implemented the state's
antidegradation policy, proscribed Alabama's pollution policy, and
described the application procedure and requirements for discharge
permits. Second, ADEM's procedures did not fit within an exception
to the definition of a rule because they were not specifically required
by statute, by existing rule, or by federal policy.
While the FAP imposes minimum requirements, or maximum
pollution levels, it does not specifically mandate what pollution levels
Alabama allows. It merely states that if Alabama allows pollution, the
allowable levels must not exceed those stated in the federal
requirements; Alabama must decide and promulgate allowable levels
and must establish criteria for discharge permits.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") likewise did not
require Alabama adopt specific procedures, forms, or economic
analyses. The EPA only required ADEM to adopt implementation
procedures within federal parameters.
Since the court found ADEM's procedures to be rules within the
meaning of the AAPA and the AEMA, ADEM violated the rulemaking
provisions of the AAPA and the AEMA. Thus, the court reversed
summary judgment in favor of ADEM and remanded for further
proceedings.
Rachel M. Sobrero

CALIFORNIA
Arreola v. County of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (allowing recovery when flood control project failed due to
counties' deliberate act of non-maintenance and state's deliberate
obstruction of floodplain).
James Arreola and approximately 300 property owners (Arreola")
sued in inverse condemnation and tort when the Pajaro River broke
through its levee during a storm, causing massive property damage.
Arreola brought his claim against the County of Santa Cruz, Santa
Cruz County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, the
County of Monterey, the Monterey County Water Resources Agency
("counties") and the State of California.
Both the counties and the state appealed from a trial court ruling
in favor of Arreola. The counties appealed on whether: (1) the trial
court properly analyzed the reasonableness of the counties' actions;
(2) inadequate maintenance of a public project can support an inverse
condemnation claim; (3) the trial court erred in defining "design
capacity" of a flood control project; (4) there was sufficient evidence to
support the findings of liability; and (5) the trial court erred in relying
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heavily on Arreola's draft in writing its Statement of Decision. The
state appealed on the following issues: whether (1) the state's liability
for an inverse condemnation claim required a showing of
unreasonableness when claim arose neither from a flood control
project, nor from surface water discharge; (2) the state had a duty to
avoid obstructing a floodplain; (3) Government Code section 830.6
provided immunity for the state; and (4) the counties' actions were a
superseding cause. The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of
California heard the case.
In 1947, the counties signed a resolution giving their assurance to
conform to federal maintenance guidelines for a flood control project
within their jurisdictions. The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
completed the project in 1949. The Corps designed the project to
have a capacity of at least 19,000 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s."), with
some evidence that the project could accommodate up to 23,000 c.f.s.
for brief periods of time. Canal maintenance required regular
mechanized clearing of vegetation and sandbars. The counties
regularly undertook mechanized clearing until 1972, when conflicts
with the California Department of Fish and Game caused the counties
to cut back to only sporadic mechanized clearings. Officials from the
counties and the state made many complaints and warnings that the
project's flood control capacity was deteriorating, and the project
required mechanized clearing. The state built a highway overpass,
utilizing an earthen embankment containing two forty-eight-inch
culverts to accommodate flows of ninety-eight c.f.s. In March 1995, a
storm overwhelmed the project, and the river broke through the levee.
When the waters reached the highway embankment, the culverts could
not accommodate the flows, and the embankment dammed the flow,
exacerbating the flood area, and causing ponding and sediment
deposit.
The court began its analysis with a background on inverse
condemnation. The court reiterated that the Albers v. County of Los
Angeles court held the constitutional requirement ofjust compensation
revolves around whether the owner of the damaged property would
contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking if left
uncompensated. Generally, a public entity is strictly liable when its
action proximately causes an injury to real property. However, the
court noted an exception to the Albers general rule of strict liability.
The so-called Archer exception arose under water law doctrines, and
held that landowners had the right to inflict damage upon others'
property in situations of flood control (the common enemy doctrine)
and discharge of surface water in a natural watercourse (the natural
watercourse rule). The court noted the Archer immunity and the
constitutional takings doctrine created a tension between competing
interests.
The court then described the two cases that devised a solution to
the competing doctrines. The Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control
Dist. court held an injured plaintiff could recover under inverse
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condemnation when a public agency's unreasonable design,
construction or maintenance was a substantial cause of the plaintiffs
damages. Locklin v. City of Lafayette fleshed out a six-part test to
determine: (1) the overall public purpose of the project; (2) the
extent to which reciprocal benefits offset plaintiffs loss; (3) the
availability of feasible, lower-risk alternatives; (4) the severity of
plaintiff's damage in relation to plaintiffs risk-bearing ability; (5) the
extent to which damage was a normal risk; and (6) the degree to
which damage is distributed over wide group of beneficiaries. The
court held the trial court correctly applied the Locklin factors in
determining that the counties acted unreasonably.
The court denied the counties' assertion that the trial court
erroneously applied the Locklin balancing test. The counties argued
the relevant public action was not the substandard maintenance of the
project, but rather the initial plan of maintenance the counties
adopted in 1947. The court examined the question of whether lack of
maintenance could be the basis for liability in inverse condemnation.
Relying primarily on Bauer v. County of Ventura, the court found lack of
maintenance was grounds for an inverse condemnation claim so long
as there was a deliberate act to undertake the particular plan or
manner of maintenance. The court found factual evidence that the
counties' lack of maintenance was a deliberate act. The court
concluded by noting that under a Locklin analysis, the lack of
maintenance was unreasonable, and therefore it was appropriate to
assess liability to the counties.
The court then denied the counties' arguments that the trial court
erroneously defined the project's design capacity. The counties
argued that any additional capacity over 19,000 c.f.s. was not part of
the project's design capacity, and failure as a result of flows over 19,000
c.f.s. did not create liability against them. The court found this
argument inapposite. It found that in fact, the Corps designed the
project to continuously accommodate 19,000 c.f.s. with temporary
capacity of 23,000 c.f.s. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
defining the design capacity as 19,000 c.f.s. with an additional 4,000
c.f.s. of temporary capacity.
The court also found no merit in the counties' argument that flows
exceeded project capacity. The jury found the flood did not exceed
the project's capacity. The court applied a deferential standard of
substantial evidence review and found substantial evidence to support
such a finding.
Finally, the court turned to Arreola's claim against the state. The
state contended the trial court did not use the proper reasonableness
standard. The court found no standard of reasonableness applied to
claims against the state. The reasonableness requirement stems from
water law principles of flood control and surface water discharge. In
this case, the action of the state that caused damage was neither flood
control nor surface water discharge. It was the construction of a
public highway that caused the damage. Without the water law
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privilege, the state was strictly liable for inverse condemnation and tort
damages. Affirming the trial court's decision, the court found that if
not compensated, Arreola would contribute more than his proper
share to the public undertaking of highway construction.
Moreover, the court found the state had a duty to avoid
obstructing the floodplain, and the state violated that duty. It used
foreseeability to determine duty, and found facts supporting the
conclusion that the highway's obstruction of floodwater was not only
foreseeable, but was foreseen. The state was aware of reports from the
Corps that a hundred-year storm could generate 43,500 c.f.s. and
overwhelm the project. Additionally, it was also aware the culverts
could not handle the resulting flood.
Since the damage was
foreseeable and foreseen, the state had a duty to avoid the damage,
and breached that duty when it built the highway to inferior standards.
The court continued its analysis by holding that Government Code
section 830.6 was not a defense for the state. In order to have
immunity under section 830.6, the state needed to show that its design
was reasonable. The court found that state's design of the highway
with ninety-eight c.f.s. culverts was unreasonable given the state's
awareness that a hundred-year flood could generate up to 43,500 c.f.s.,
far over the project's capacity.
The court finished its analysis by denying the state's argument that
failure of the project was a superseding cause. The court reasoned in
order for cause to be superseding, it must be unforeseeable. In this
case, the failure of the project was not only foreseeable, but also
foreseen. Therefore failure of the project could not be a superseding
cause.
James Parrot

California v. Murrison, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that notification to the Department of the Fish and Game is
required where a diversion of water occurs).
Scott Edgar Murrison ("Murrison") placed rocks and gravel across
Big Creek, a small creek in Trinity County, to divert ninety-five percent
of the water flow from the creek to a diversion ditch. The Fish and
Game Code ("Code") stated that it was unlawful for any person to
substantially divert or obstruct the natural flow or substantially change
the bed, channel, or bank of any river, stream, or lake without first
notifying the Department of the Fish and Game ("DFG") of the
activity. The State of California brought suit against Murrison for
violation of the Code. The Superior Court of Trinity County found
that Murrison substantially altered the creek without complying with
the Code, enjoining Murrison from further diversion, and assessing
civil penalties. Murrison appealed to the Court of Appeals of
California, claiming his water right could not be limited by the Code,

